GCVE-110-OSM-2026-9571

This package is a self-described dependency-confusion / security-research PoC ('internal placeholder (security research PoC)') published by a zero-history account 'haxster'. The setup.py fires on install, egg_info, and build phases, collecting hostname and username and exfiltrating them via DNS and HTTP to a Burp Collaborator / oastify.com OAST endpoint (lxmvrxcjz4d4m7k36qyjcxyg57byzond.oastify.com). The attacker model is classic dependency confusion: publish a high-version internal-namespace package and beacon back when CI/CD or a developer inadvertently installs it. Although the author labels it a PoC, OSM policy treats such packages as suspicious rather than benign because they actively exfiltrate real victim environment data to an attacker-controlled OAST listener — the 'PoC' label is unverifiable and the package has real code-exec-on-install capability. The static score of 25 grossly understates the risk given the critical OAST finding and install-hook chain. ENTRY setup.py (install-hook: install/develop/build override present) - setup.py Code Execution in setup.py DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in poc_callback.py: "oastify.com" - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in setup.py: "oastify.com" - Network Request in poc_callback.py: "urllib.request.urlopen(" - System Information Collection in poc_callback.py: "socket.gethostname()" - DNS Lookup in poc_callback.py: "socket.getaddrinfo(" - Suspicious Domain in poc_callback.py: "oastify.com" - Network Request in setup.py: "urllib.request.urlopen(" - System Information Collection in setup.py: "socket.gethostname()" (+2 more) ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in poc_callback.py: "subprocess.run(" - Silent Process Execution in poc_callback.py: "stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL" - Setup.py Command Override in setup.py: "cmdclass={"install": _Install, "develop"" PAYLOAD FILES setup.py (+ poc_callback.py)