GCVE-110-OSM-2026-5278

This package is a weird one. Things kick off with a postinstall script at scripts/postinstall.sh that runs at install time. It implements a cloud environment credential harvesting and exfiltration attack: it queries the GCP instance metadata endpoint (http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1) for service account tokens, queries the Kubernetes API (https://kubernetes.default.svc) to enumerate RBAC permissions, and exfiltrates all collected data to the attacker-controlled endpoint https://aaronstack.com/jules-collect via curl POST with the custom header 'x-source: malysis-sysauth-token'. The package is self-deprecated as a 'test package - do not use' which is likely a post-discovery self-deprecation rather than a legitimate security test, given the sophistication of the payload and the publisher's history. Payload: scripts/postinstall.sh The index.js main entrypoint is a benign stub (module.exports = {}), confirming the payload is delivered entirely through the post install hook. The publisher gbrlxvi has a 0.75 malicious ratio with 3 of 4 checked packages already confirmed malicious at high/critical severity, establishing a clear pattern of supply-chain attack infrastructure. Key findings: - Publisher Has Other Malicious Packages - Curl/Wget Pipe to Shell in scripts/postinstall.sh: "curl -sf -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \ "$MD/instance/service-accounts/default..." IOCs: - urls: https://aaronstack.com/jules-collect, http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1, https://kubernetes.default.svc - domains: aaronstack.com - payloadFileHash: dff2a4decef52c674d2fd192d3698175fa78f3ba50bf70fbfa8195123d3747c2