GCVE-110-OSM-2026-4458

This package was compromised during the 2026-05-19 "Mini Shai-Hulud" npm supply-chain campaign that began with the takeover of the `atool` maintainer account (the AntV / TeamPCP compromise). The injected payload contains worm-like npm-propagation logic: it validates any npm tokens it harvests, enumerates packages the token owner can publish, injects itself, and republishes them. This package belongs to a secondary maintainer account reached by that propagation, not to `atool` directly. The republished tarballs carry the same Mini Shai-Hulud payload and beacon to the same C2 infrastructure. Any version of this package published on 2026-05-19 must be treated as compromised. === PAYLOAD: npm Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain worm (atool / TeamPCP campaign) === Campaign origin : takeover of npm maintainer account `atool` (TeamPCP) Attack vector : stolen/phished npm publishing credential or leaked automation/CI token; self-propagation via harvested npm tokens Affected versions of this package (republished 2026-05-19): 2.1.1 Mass-publish waves (UTC): Wave 1 : 2026-05-19T01:39:31Z - 2026-05-19T01:56:46Z Wave 2 : 2026-05-19T02:05:59Z - 2026-05-19T02:06:05Z Install vector: Root-level index.js payload; package.json modified with "preinstall": "bun run index.js" plus an optionalDependencies entry "@antv/setup" pointing at a standalone GitHub commit for an additional lifecycle-execution path. Command-and-control / exfiltration infrastructure: Domain : t.m-kosche.com C2 URL : https://t.m-kosche.com:443/api/public/otel/v1/traces IP : 185.95.159.32 Behavior: Heavily obfuscated Bun payload. Harvests GitHub/npm tokens, AWS, GCP, Kubernetes, Vault, SSH and Docker credentials, and CI/CD secrets across major CI platforms. Collected data is gzip-compressed, AES-256-GCM encrypted (RSA-OAEP-wrapped key) and exfiltrated to the C2 endpoint disguised as an OpenTelemetry trace collector. A GitHub fallback creates a repository under the victim account, committing stolen data to results/results-<timestamp>-<counter>.json under a Dune-themed repo name and the marker "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again". Includes worm logic to republish further packages reachable by any stolen npm token. Remediation: pin to a version published before 2026-05-19; audit lockfiles and CI caches; install with --ignore-scripts; block t.m-kosche.com and 185.95.159.32 at the network egress; rotate every npm token and environment secret exposed to builds that resolved an affected version.