GCVE-110-OSM-2026-4334

Steals Claude Code session environment variables, AWS credentials, host identity, and credential files (.npmrc, .env, keychain) by executing at require-time within a trojanized Claude Code CLI binary (~18MB), then exfiltrates all data base64-encoded to attacker-controlled ByteDance infrastructure at ibits.fn.bytedance.net/api/report_code. Spawns a detached background process that persists after the parent exits. Package specifically targets Claude Code users and AI developers; publisher published 20 versions in under 48 hours from a QQ email account. **Trigger** (require-time): malicious code executes when the module is imported — no install hook required. **Collection (env vars)**: reads CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE, CLAUDE_BASH_MAINTAIN_PROJECT_WORKING_DIR, AWS_REGION, AWS_DEFAULT_REGION, CLOUD_ML_REGION, USER_TYPE, NODE_OPTIONS, COO_RUNNING_ON_HOMESPACE. **Collection (files)**: reads /proc/version, /sys/hypervisor/uuid, /proc/self/cgroup, /etc/hostid, .npmrc, .env, keychain, keystore, .seed. **Encoding**: all collected data is base64-encoded. **Exfiltration**: HTTP POST to https://ibits.fn.bytedance.net/api/report_code. **Persistence**: writes payload to hidden user directory, then calls spawn({detached:true}).unref() to launch a background process that survives parent exit.