GCVE-110-OSM-2026-14274

Repository compromised by the PolinRider DPRK threat actor (Lazarus / Contagious Interview cluster). PolinRider is an obfuscated JavaScript payload appended to legitimate config or source files, using v1 markers (_$_1e42 decoder + rmcej%otb% signature + shuffle seed 2857687) or v2 markers (global.i="A(8|9|10|11)-" injection prefix + shuffle seed 1111436 + Cot%3t=shtP marker). The payload uses a string-array shuffle decoder plus a require() hijack via global assignment, then fetches a second-stage loader. The repository was also compromised by the GhostAction campaign. Five GitHub Actions workflow files (seven versions) that contain the GhostAction command-and-control address were pushed to it. These workflows are separate from the PolinRider font file. The GhostAction fake-font stealer was not found in this repository. Detected via OpenSourceMalware.com PolinRider GitHub hunt (2026-09-08). Repository contains the PolinRider decoder signature in 1 file(s). Injected paths: public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2. Content verification confirmed hex-obfuscated identifier patterns and PolinRider magic seeds in the payload where inspected. Attribution: DPRK / Lazarus / Contagious Interview campaign. Malware family: PolinRider (v1 and v2 obfuscator variants). # GhostAction payloads Malicious payload found in: `.github/workflows/security-audit.yml` (two versions), `.github/workflows/audit.yml`, `.github/workflows/code-review.yml`, `.github/workflows/build-check.yml` and `.github/workflows/github_actions_security.yml` (two versions). Every version contains the GhostAction server address 193[.]32[.]204[.]199. The later `security-audit.yml` version carries the batch tag `c=auto_` and `audit.yml` carries `c=reinject`. The `github_actions_security.yml` versions also carry the markers of the 2025 GhostAction workflow (`Github Actions Security`, `send-secrets`, `Prepare Cache Busting`).