GCVE-110-OSM-2026-14114

fabtoolkit executes a payload (embedded as a CHILD string run via `subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-I','-c',CHILD],...)`) that fetches a JSON config from https://transfer.archivete.am/H2Uxm/fabdeploycheck-config.json with TLS verification disabled (`ssl._create_unverified_context()`) and dispatches on config-supplied `kind` values: `file` reads arbitrary filesystem paths, `run` executes attacker-supplied argv via subprocess, `http` issues attacker-chosen requests with Bearer tokens chained from previously-read files, `tcp` probes ports, and `revsh` forks a daemon that polls `base+'/'+ident+'-cmd.txt'` and pipes the returned bytes into `/bin/sh -c`, PUTting stdout/stderr back to the same host. Collected file contents, command output, HTTP responses, and probe results are packed into an in-memory zip and PUT to transfer.archivete.am under an attacker-chosen report name. Before daemonizing, the payload walks `/proc/*/cmdline` and SIGKILLs processes whose cmdlines contain `FABDRV3`, `fabdrv2`, or `connection ready`, enforcing single-instance persistence and clearing prior variants. The entry points `python -m fabtoolkit` and any import path reaching `selftest()`/`check()` trigger the payload. The destination is an anonymous public file-transfer host; config-controlled file reads enable harvesting of credentials such as `~/.aws/credentials` and `~/.ssh/*` along with cloud metadata via the `http` kind. The package has no legitimate functionality matching its naming. ENTRY fabtoolkit/__init__.py (module-import: 8) ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Brand New Package - Rapid Version Publishing