GCVE-110-OSM-2026-13877

This VS Code extension presents a coherent and internally consistent architecture for GitHub Copilot model routing — the LemonSqueezy licensing endpoints, OpenRouter.ai, local proxy on 127.0.0.1:3456, and direct Copilot API calls all fit its stated purpose, and the IOC classifier's 'c2' label on api.githubcopilot.com is a false positive given that proxying Copilot is the core function. The primary concern is the `sensitive-file-read` hit in `out/tools/WorkspaceTools.js` matching `/etc/passwd`, combined with `child_process` usage in the same file — on its own `/etc/passwd` can be a legitimate Unix username/homedir lookup, but without seeing the full WorkspaceTools.js body it cannot be ruled out as credential harvesting. The `GitHubInstallTracker.js` shell execution is also unexplained by the stated feature set and could silently collect environment data on install. The publisher has zero prior packages and a single version, which weakens trust but is not independently damning for a new commercial extension. No obfuscation, no exfil webhooks, and no OSV advisory are present — this does not look like a supply-chain attack, but the /etc/passwd + shell combo in WorkspaceTools warrants a code review before deployment. ENTRY out/extension.js (vscode-activation: [object Object]) DESTINATION - 3 c2 (urls, domains) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Sensitive File Access in out/tools/WorkspaceTools.js: ""/etc/passwd"" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in out/graphify/GraphifyService.js: "require("child_process")" PAYLOAD FILES out/tools/WorkspaceTools.js