GCVE-110-OSM-2026-13319

On module load, thunderboltRegistry.js executes an IIFE that runs id, whoami, uname, ifconfig/ip addr via child_process.execSync and reads /etc/hosts, then sends each result together with hostname, node version, platform and pid to the hardcoded endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/[token] via fetch over plain HTTP. The package presents itself as a stub exporting proxies for Wix thunderbolt internal registry names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.), consistent with dependency-confusion targeting of those internal module names while the load-time code performs the host reconnaissance and exfiltration. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Data Encoding for Exfiltration in thunderboltRegistry.js: "encodeURIComponent(site)).catch(function(){}); } catch(e" - System Information Collection in thunderboltRegistry.js: "process.platform" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in thunderboltRegistry.js: "require("child_process")" - Very New NPM Publisher Account - Publisher Has Other Malicious Packages PAYLOAD FILES thunderboltRegistry.js