GCVE-110-OSM-2026-13315

The package advertises itself as a CSS anchor-position polyfill but on require executes an IIFE in thunderboltRegistry.js that runs `id`, `whoami`, `uname -a`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and reads `/etc/hosts`, then POSTs the collected output along with hostname, platform, and Node version via fetch to the hardcoded external endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/. The module also exports keys named after Wix thunderbolt internal registries (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) with a bundled manifest referencing a parastorage.com unpkg URL, a shape consistent with dependency-confusion targeting of an internal Wix build pipeline. The advertised polyfill purpose is unrelated to shell execution, host reconnaissance, or outbound beaconing. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Data Encoding for Exfiltration in thunderboltRegistry.js: "encodeURIComponent(site)).catch(function(){}); } catch(e" - System Information Collection in thunderboltRegistry.js: "process.platform" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in thunderboltRegistry.js: "require("child_process")" - Very New NPM Publisher Account - Publisher Has Other Malicious Packages PAYLOAD FILES thunderboltRegistry.js