GCVE-110-OSM-2026-13292

On require, thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE that acquires child_process via multiple fallbacks and executes shell commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, cat /etc/hosts), then GETs the collected output along with the hostname, platform and Node version to the hardcoded plain-HTTP endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. One of the beacons is self-labeled beacon=rce-poc. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exposes modules named thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry and corvidRegistry — internal Wix Thunderbolt names — behind a Proxy returning no-op functions, with registry-manifest.min.json pointing fake entries at a static.parastorage.com URL, so a consumer that resolves this package in place of the real Wix internals loads the exfiltration IIFE while the facade silently returns no-ops. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Data Encoding for Exfiltration in thunderboltRegistry.js: "encodeURIComponent(site)).catch(function(){}); } catch(e" - System Information Collection in thunderboltRegistry.js: "process.platform" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in thunderboltRegistry.js: "require("child_process")" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account - Publisher Has Other Malicious Packages PAYLOAD FILES thunderboltRegistry.js