GCVE-110-OSM-2026-12519

This package is part of the Graphalgo campaign, an ongoing npm supply chain operation running since at least March 2026. It shares smart contract C2 infrastructure, Slack channels, and Telegram exfiltration channels with over 20 other packages in the campaign confirmed by JFrog Security Research. ## Trigger Malicious code is embedded in the package's main prototype setter (e.g., `BTree.prototype.set`). When invoked with a specific key value, it spawns a detached `node` process running the obfuscated first-stage loader (`extended/sharedLoad.min.js`) with `stdio: "ignore"` and `windowsHide: true`. No postinstall hook is used. ## First stage The loader fingerprints the host (OS, architecture, hostname, CPU count, memory, uptime) and exfiltrates to: - Slack channel `C0B8XPGCKQS` via embedded `xoxb` bot token - Telegram chat `-1003952553968` via bot `8961878831` It then connects to Ethereum Sepolia via `hxxps://eth-sepolia[.]g[.]alchemy[.]com/v2/D2-TbkB2m05WXSnSDOCDI` and `hxxps://sepolia[.]infura[.]io/v3/dc7257d09fab42eca2c354c32fec1938`, reads encrypted blobs from smart contract `0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31`, performs X25519 ECDH key exchange using hardcoded TA public key `bad013df6eec5d686f4cc8551e0a5c87a0135164bdd1dafb1c75141d1b526702`, decrypts and executes the second stage. ## Second stage A Slack polling agent checks `slack[.]com/api/conversations.history` every 10 seconds using a second embedded `xoxb` bot token (channel `C0B8GEPFMK9`), decrypts chunked operator messages using AES-GCM/PBKDF2, reassembles them into `~/subwatcher`, and executes it — providing persistent remote command execution. The loader then self-deletes and strips the trigger from the prototype.