GCVE-110-OSM-2026-12502

wos-library-ui@99.0.0 declares scripts.preinstall = 'node poc.js', which auto-runs on npm install. poc.js reads os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and process.cwd() and transmits them to the hardcoded Interactsh subdomain csytkgaubytabdgcvgljmgf8o1uj876pg.oast.fun via both a DNS A-record lookup (encoding host/user in the subdomain) and an http.request POST. The package name and inflated 99.0.0 version match the classic dependency-confusion shape targeting an internal 'wos-library-ui' package (self-described as an Inditex WOS PoC): any resolver that prefers the public npm registry will pull this artifact instead of the internal one and execute the beacon, disclosing internal host identifiers and build-path details to a third-party out-of-band collector. Self-labeling as a bug-bounty PoC does not alter the installer-side effect: unconsented install-time exfiltration of installer identity from a namesquatted package on the public registry. Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Brand New Package