GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10746

dist/index.js of @wizloft/harness-plugin-repository-files ships a small legitimate wizloft-harness repository-files plugin followed at line 209 by a ~35KB obfuscator.io-packed IIFE (303-entry rotated string array _0x240a with decoder _0x4963, control-flow flattening, hex-named identifiers). Decoded strings in the appended segment include Ethereum JSON-RPC and block-explorer endpoints (drpc.org, publicnode.com, blockscout, an etherscan-style txlist/account API), a hardcoded mixed-case ETH address prefix 0xa322E5f3..., a forged Chrome User-Agent, brotli/gzip decompression, AbortController-based fetch, and a custom /0x/ls exfil path with x-payload-* headers. The payload runs at module load whenever a consumer imports the package and has no relationship to the advertised purpose of reading repository files for a harness runtime. Only the trailing segment is obfuscated; the legitimate plugin portion is plain ESM, indicating a hostile payload smuggled onto an otherwise-clean plugin build. Judge assessment: This looks like a supply-chain compromise of a legitimate wizloft-harness plugin: the plain repository-files implementation is followed in the released bundle by an attacker-controlled payload that runs at module load. The OSV advisory is strongly corroborated by the reported obfuscator.io-packed IIFE, decoded Ethereum RPC/explorer endpoints, forged Chrome User-Agent, and the custom `/0x/ls` exfil path with `x-payload-*` headers, none of which fit a repository-file contributor. The attacker model is a cryptostealer / data exfiltrator smuggled into a trusted npm package to harvest wallet-related or environment-derived data when imported. The metadata is otherwise normal, but the code-level evidence of hidden obfuscated networked behavior is decisive. ENTRY dist/index.js (default-index: index.js)