GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10737

On require/import, index.js immediately invokes an initializer that HTTP-GETs a JSON document from https://api.jsonbin.io/v3/b/6a4f5816f5f4af5e29762c92, extracts the `record.cerookie` field, and executes its contents as JavaScript via `new (Function.constructor)('require',...)(require)`. The evaluated code runs with full Node.js privileges and access to `require`, and the payload is hosted on a third-party mutable JSON store controlled by the package author, so the executed code can change at any time without republishing. The file is cover-labeled as `normalize-path (ES6 safe version)` and contains an unused normalizePath helper and a `Safe request helper` comment to obscure the loader; the Function constructor is reached indirectly via `Function.constructor` and the payload field is named `cerookie` to reduce recognizability. The stated purpose (an Express route engine) has no legitimate need to fetch and evaluate remote code on load. Judge assessment: This is a remote-code-loader pattern consistent with a supply-chain attacker seeking arbitrary code execution on import. In `index.js`, `initPlugin()` immediately GETs `https://api.jsonbin.io/v3/b/6a4f5816f5f4af5e29762c92`, parses `record.cerookie`, and executes it via `new (Function.constructor)('require', ...)`, which runs with full Node.js privileges and access to `require`. The package is cover-labeled as `normalize-path (ES6 safe version)` and includes an unused helper plus misleading comments, while the actual attacker-controlled payload is hosted on a mutable JSON store. The combination of `paste-download`, `custom-c2` on `api.jsonbin.io`, and dynamic `Function.constructor` execution leaves no plausible benign explanation for a package called `express-route-engine`. ENTRY index.js (main: index.js) DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Payload Download from Paste Service in index.js: "jsonbin.io" PAYLOAD FILES index.js