GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10732

The package's main entry runs a worker that performs an HTTPS GET to https://realase-0626.vercel.app/api/v1 and passes the response's `parser` string into vm.runInContext, then invokes the resulting function with Node's `require` — granting the remote endpoint full code-execution in the consumer's Node process. The destination URL is concealed as a hex byte array in constants.js (pluginIDs) and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, hiding the non-publisher C2 domain from casual inspection. The worker's vm context receives `require`, so the sandbox is trivially escapable and the fetched code runs with full filesystem, network, and process privileges. This behavior fires on `require('expect-dotenv')` followed by `.config()` or `.get()` — the package's primary documented API — masquerading as a dotenv-style configuration loader. ENTRY lib/env-var-base.js (main: lib/env-var-base.js) EXFIL - Network Request in lib/workers/runWorker.js: "https.get(" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Dynamic Code Execution in lib/workers/plugin.worker.js: "vm.runInContext" - Dangerous Function Calls in lib/workers/plugin.worker.js: "require("vm")" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account PAYLOAD FILES lib/workers/plugin.worker.js