VDB
GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10710
GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10710
Advisory PublishedCVSS 9.6/10
main.js imports child_process and issues POST requests to a hardcoded endpoint at https://ipc.shadxino.internal (referenced at lines 358 and 452, with POST calls at lines 364 and 368). The destination is not a documented public service and combined with child_process usage in the same module matches the shape of an installer-side data exfiltration / remote-command channel. The `.internal` TLD is non-routable on the public internet, suggesting either a lure destination or infrastructure meant to be resolved via a custom resolver on compromised hosts.
Judge assessment: This looks like a credential-theft and persistence payload disguised as a DOM/diagnostic utility, consistent with a third-party attacker model targeting npm consumers. The entrypoint `bin/kalamasha-tool.js` hides itself via detached `spawn(...)` with `stdio: 'ignore'`, clones `electron.exe` to `SearchApp.exe`, and respawns as a background watchdog, while `main.js` loads browser/session tokens and persists via `.profile`/startup-style behavior. Most importantly, `main.js` contains explicit exfiltration to `https://ipc.shadxino.internal/login_post` and related `.internal` endpoints, plus the `chai-max-browser-theft` rule matches Chrome/Brave cookie access in `bin/chrome_cookies.ps1`. The combination of `dynamic-code-execution`, `startup-persistence`, and recovered custom-C2 IOCs is not compatible with a legitimate library.
ENTRY
bin/kalamasha-tool.js (bin: bin/kalamasha-tool.js)
- Postinstall Script in package.json: ""postinstall": "node -e \""
PERSISTENCE
- Startup Persistence in main.js: ".profile"
- Startup Persistence in profile-picker.html: ".profile"
DESTINATION
- 6 exfil (custom-c2)
(values recorded in verified_iocs)
EXFIL
- System Information Collection in main.js: "process.platform"
- Network Request in profile-picker.html: "fetch('https:"
OBFUSCATION
- Whitespace-Padded Hidden Payload in main.js: "; let"
- Dynamic Base64 Decoding in main.js: "atob(parts["
- Deobfuscation Failed in main.js
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
- Chai-Max Browser Data Theft in bin/chrome_cookies.ps1: "BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data" if (Test-Path $bravePath) { $cookies = Ge..."
- Stealth Background Process Spawning in bin/kalamasha-tool.js: "spawn(process.execPath, [__filename, '--background'], { detached: true, stdio: '..."
- Shell Command Execution in bin/kalamasha-tool.js: "require('child_process')"
- Silent Process Execution in bin/kalamasha-tool.js: "stdio: 'ignore'"
- Detached Child Process Payload in bin/kalamasha-tool.js: "spawn(finalPath, [mainPath], { stdio: 'ignore', detached: true"
- Dynamic Code Execution in main.js: "exec(text)"
(+3 more)
PAYLOAD FILES
main.js
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-506Embedded Malicious Code
Risk Scores
CVSS 3.1
9.6/10
Critical · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Products
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | moidevy | 1.0.0 (affected) | — |
Aliases
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