GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10270

Git Warden confirmed this repository as malicious by static analysis of its source code. The code was read, never executed. The malicious code sits in the file .vscode/tasks.json. The code runs automatically from a Visual Studio Code task configured to trigger on folderOpen. Nothing has to be installed, built, or clicked. Opening the project folder in the editor is enough to run the attacker's command. The task fetches a remote script and pipes it straight into a shell, with a separate payload selected for macOS, Linux and Windows. It also carries a presentation block that sets reveal to never and echo to false and closes the panel afterwards, which hides the terminal so the victim never sees the command run. Suppressing output next to a fetch and pipe has no legitimate use and shows the intent is concealment. No legitimate project ships code like this. The repository was either compromised or purpose-built to deliver malware to anyone who clones or installs it. The evidence references list the exact file, line, and matching rule, so a reviewer can open the repository and verify each one independently. The delivery method, a .vscode/tasks.json task that automatically runs a remote shell command the moment the repository is opened in VS Code, matches the DPRK-attributed 'Contagious Interview' campaign, in which fake recruiters lure developers into opening a coding-task repository that silently executes a first-stage downloader. The payload is fetched from attacker-controlled infrastructure: codeviewer-three.vercel.app. This repository is one of 117 that git_warden has confirmed delivering this same dropper, a single campaign that rotates its command-and-control infrastructure across 13 distinct hosts (for example codeviewer-three.vercel.app, coreviewer.vercel.app, default-configuration-sandy.vercel.app, default-configuration.vercel.app, jerryfox-platform.vercel.app, task-hrec.vercel.app) while reusing the same URL path fingerprints (settings/linux?flag=, task/linux?token=, task/mac?token=, task/windows?token=). Matching only a host would miss most of the cluster; matching the delivery shape found all of it. Attribution: the tradecraft is consistent with North Korea, but a single signal is a lead rather than an attribution, so we do not attribute it on this evidence alone. The evidence behind this is: (1) Delivery vector matches Contagious-Interview tradecraft: vscode-folderopen-autorun. The malicious payload sits in .vscode/tasks.json. The code runs automatically from a Visual Studio Code task configured to trigger on folderOpen. Nothing has to be installed, built, or clicked. Opening the project folder in the editor is enough to run the attacker's command. The task fetches a remote script and pipes it straight into a shell, with a separate payload selected for macOS, Linux and Windows. It also carries a presentation block that sets reveal to never and echo to false and closes the panel afterwards, which hides the terminal so the victim never sees the command run. Suppressing output next to a fetch and pipe has no legitimate use and shows the intent is concealment.