GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10252

This package is a credential-theft and exfiltration loader masquerading as an OpenZeppelin-related dependency, with the install hooks running `index.js` on both preinstall and postinstall. The code explicitly harvests `process.env`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, `.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.gitconfig`, `.aws/credentials`, `.kube/config`, `.npmrc`, and `.env` files, then sends the collected data to a `webhook.site` endpoint from a detached background process that survives the install window. The attacker model is a supply-chain operator stealing developer secrets and environment tokens during npm installation, and the stealthy `spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' })` plus delayed sender shows deliberate evasion. The package metadata is also burner-like (`missing-description`, `no-repository`, `metadata-minimal`), reinforcing that this is not a legitimate library behavior. ENTRY index.js (install-hook: node index.js || true) - Install Hook Executes Local JS File in package.json - Postinstall Script in package.json EXFIL - Environment Variable Exfiltration in index.js: "JSON.stringify(process.env)" - Sensitive File Access in index.js: "'.ssh/id_rsa'" - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in index.js: "webhook.site" - Git Configuration Access in index.js: ".gitconfig" - Network Request in index.js: "https.request(" - System Information Collection in index.js: "os.userInfo()" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Stealth Background Process Spawning in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }" - Shell Command Execution in index.js: "require('child_process')" - Silent Process Execution in index.js: "stdio: 'ignore'" - Detached Child Process Payload in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true" PAYLOAD FILES index.js