GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10229

This is a credential-theft and exfiltration installer masquerading as an Aerodrome contract package, with the attacker model clearly being a supply-chain implant that harvests developer secrets at install time. The entrypoint reads `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.aws/credentials`, `.gitconfig`, `.env` files, Foundry keystores, and `JSON.stringify(process.env)`, then packages the loot into a detached delayed sender. It posts to a hardcoded `webhook.site` endpoint using `https.request`, and uses `spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' })` to survive the install window and hide output. The `preinstall` and `postinstall` hooks in `package.json` ensure arbitrary code runs on install, and the brand-new publisher account strengthens the supply-chain compromise assessment. ENTRY index.js (install-hook: node index.js || true) - Install Hook Executes Local JS File in package.json - Postinstall Script in package.json EXFIL - Environment Variable Exfiltration in index.js: "JSON.stringify(process.env)" - Sensitive File Access in index.js: "'.ssh/id_rsa'" - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in index.js: "webhook.site" - Git Configuration Access in index.js: ".gitconfig" - Network Request in index.js: "https.request(" - System Information Collection in index.js: "os.userInfo()" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Stealth Background Process Spawning in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }" - Shell Command Execution in index.js: "require('child_process')" - Silent Process Execution in index.js: "stdio: 'ignore'" - Detached Child Process Payload in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account PAYLOAD FILES index.js