GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10228

This package is a credential-theft and environment exfiltration implant executing at install time via both preinstall and postinstall hooks. The entrypoint (index.js) reads SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519), AWS credentials, kubeconfig, .npmrc, .gitconfig, GCP credentials, Solana/Anchor/Sui keystores, Foundry keystores, and .env files, then collects all environment variables matching a broad secret-harvesting regex. All stolen data is serialized and exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to an attacker-controlled website. The payload is deliberately launched as a detached child process with stdio suppressed and a randomized 60–240 second delay to evade both installer exit and scanner timing windows. The publisher account (mssjeep843) is under a day old and has already had two other packages (@aerodrome-finance/contracts, @aerodrome-finance/slipstream) confirmed malicious at high severity, establishing a clear campaign pattern targeting Web3/DeFi developers. ENTRY index.js (install-hook: node index.js || true) - Install Hook Executes Local JS File in package.json - Postinstall Script in package.json EXFIL - Environment Variable Exfiltration in index.js: "JSON.stringify(process.env)" - Sensitive File Access in index.js: "'.ssh/id_rsa'" - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in index.js: "webhook.site" - Git Configuration Access in index.js: ".gitconfig" - Network Request in index.js: "https.request(" - System Information Collection in index.js: "os.userInfo()" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Stealth Background Process Spawning in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }" - Shell Command Execution in index.js: "require('child_process')" - Silent Process Execution in index.js: "stdio: 'ignore'" - Detached Child Process Payload in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account (+1 more) PAYLOAD FILES index.js