GCVE-110-OSM-2026-10226

This package implements a classic credential-harvesting and exfiltration attack. The entrypoint index.js runs via both preinstall and postinstall hooks, performs sandbox/honeypot evasion checks (hostname/username/env patterns), then harvests SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519), AWS credentials, kubeconfig, .npmrc, .gitconfig, GCP credentials, Solana/Foundry keystores, .env files, and all environment variables matching a broad credential regex. It then spawns a detached child process with stdio suppressed that sleeps 60–240 seconds (to outlive install-time scanners) before POSTing the stolen data to an attacker-controlled url. The publisher mssjeep843 has a 40% malicious ratio with two prior confirmed-malicious packages (@aerodrome-finance/contracts, @aerodrome-finance/slipstream), all published from a brand-new account impersonating legitimate DeFi projects. This is a supply-chain attack targeting Web3 developers. ENTRY index.js (install-hook: node index.js || true) - Install Hook Executes Local JS File in package.json - Postinstall Script in package.json EXFIL - Environment Variable Exfiltration in index.js: "JSON.stringify(process.env)" - Sensitive File Access in index.js: "'.ssh/id_rsa'" - OAST/Interactsh Exfiltration in index.js: "webhook.site" - Git Configuration Access in index.js: ".gitconfig" - Network Request in index.js: "https.request(" - System Information Collection in index.js: "os.userInfo()" ADDITIONAL FINDINGS - Stealth Background Process Spawning in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }" - Shell Command Execution in index.js: "require('child_process')" - Silent Process Execution in index.js: "stdio: 'ignore'" - Detached Child Process Payload in index.js: "spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true" - Brand New Package - Very New NPM Publisher Account (+1 more) PAYLOAD FILES index.js