VDB

CVE-2026-68441

CVE-2026-68441 PUBLISHED

net/sched: Handle TC_ACT_REDIRECT from qdisc filter chains

Reported by linux · Published August 12, 2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Handle TC_ACT_REDIRECT from qdisc filter chains When a TC filter attached to a qdisc filter chain returns TC_ACT_REDIRECT (ex: via an eBPF program calling bpf_redirect() or an act_bpf action), the redirect was silently lost i.e no qdisc classify function handled TC_ACT_REDIRECT, so the packet fell through the switch and was enqueued normally instead of being redirected. This has been broken since bpf_redirect() was introduced for TC in commit 27b29f63058d ("bpf: add bpf_redirect() helper"). We got lucky for a long time because bpf_net_context was a per-CPU variable that was always available. commit 401cb7dae813 ("net: Reference bpf_redirect_info via task_struct on PREEMPT_RT.") turned bpf_net_context into a task_struct member that is only set up by explicit callers. Without a caller setting it up, bpf_redirect() itself crashes with a NULL pointer dereference in bpf_net_ctx_get_ri(). However, even with bpf_net_context available, TC_ACT_REDIRECT from qdisc filter chains cannot be honored without adding skb_do_redirect() calls to every qdisc classify function, which would require changes across net/sched/. Isolate it to ebpf core where it belongs. Instead, add a tcf_classify_qdisc() inline helper in pkt_cls.h, as a wrapper around tcf_classify() for use by qdisc classify functions and tcf_qevent_handle(). When the classify verdict is TC_ACT_REDIRECT, the wrapper converts it to TC_ACT_SHOT, dropping the packet rather than letting it continue silently. Dropping is preferred over letting the packet through because the user immediately sees packet loss. Silently passing the packet through would hide the problem and leave the user wondering why their redirect is not working. The clsact fast path, tc_run() continues to call tcf_classify() directly and is unaffected: TC_ACT_REDIRECT is returned as-is and handled by sch_handle_egress/ingress() calling skb_do_redirect() as before.

EPSS 0.20% · 10.0th percentile

Fixed versions

Upgrade to a fixed version or later. Language registries are listed first, then Linux distributions, then vendor products.

PackageEcosystemFixed in
bpftool6.12Amazon Linux1:6.12.114-139.210.amzn2023
kernel6.12-develAmazon Linux1:6.12.114-139.210.amzn2023

Risk scores

EPSS Score
0.20%
10.0th percentile

Affected products

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux27b29f63058d26c6c1742f1993338280d5a41dc6, 27b29f63058d26c6c1742f1993338280d5a41dc6, 27b29f63058d26c6c1742f1993338280d5a41dc6
LinuxLinux4.4, 0, 6.1.191
amazon:2023bpftool6.120
amazon:2023kernel6.12-devel0
linuxlinux_kernel4.4, 4.4, 4.4
LinuxLinux7.2, 27b29f63058d26c6c1742f1993338280d5a41dc6, 27b29f63058d26c6c1742f1993338280d5a41dc6
amazon:2023kernel6.12-tools0
amazon:2023kernel6.12-tools-devel0
amazon:2023kernel-livepatch-6.12.114-139.2100
amazon:2023kernel6.12-headers0
amazon:2023perf6.120
amazon:2023kernel6.12-modules-extra-common0
amazon:2023python3-perf6.120
amazon:2023kernel6.120
amazon:2023kernel6.12-modules-extra0

Timeline

  • Aug 12, 2026 Coalition ESS Score
  • Aug 12, 2026 CVE Published
  • Aug 14, 2026 Security Advisory
  • Aug 24, 2026 EPSS Score (14 in total, the first dated here)
  • Oct 30, 2026 CVE Updated

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